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Gross Worker Flows over the Business Cycle†
By Per Krusell, Toshihiko Mukoyama, Richard Rogerson,  
and AyşegÜl Şahin*
We build a hybrid model of the aggregate labor market that features 
both standard labor supply forces and frictions in order to study the 
cyclical properties of gross worker flows across the three labor mar-
ket states: employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation. Our 
parsimonious model is able to capture the key features of the cyclical 
movements in gross worker flows. Despite the fact that the wage per 
efficiency unit is constant over time, intertemporal substitution plays 
an important role in shaping fluctuations in the participation rate. 
(JEL E24, E32, J22, J31, J64, J65)
Modern research on aggregate labor market dynamics stresses the importance of 
microfounded models of labor market flows as a way to connect micro and macro 
data. In this paper we build a parsimonious model of individual labor supply in the 
presence of labor market frictions and assess its ability to account for gross worker 
flows between employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation over the business 
cycle.
Our model represents a hybrid of the two classes of benchmark models that dom-
inate the literature: heterogeneous agent models in the spirit of Lucas and Rapping 
(1969), and reflected in Chang and Kim (2006), and search models in the spirit of 
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Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). In the former, workers flow between employ-
ment and nonemployment and these flows represent optimal labor supply responses 
to changes in prices. In the latter, workers are passive, always wanting to work 
but subject to frictions that sometimes prevent them from working, thus generating 
flows between unemployment and employment. Reality seems to reflect elements 
of both benchmarks, and to the extent that participation reflects the desire to work 
and unemployment reflects frictions that create a wedge between desired and actual 
labor supply, we think the natural starting point for assessing a hybrid model of 
labor supply is to confront it with data on the gross worker flows.
Our analysis begins by documenting the cyclical properties of gross flows. We 
stress two key patterns. First, although the participation rate is much less volatile 
over the business cycle than either the unemployment or employment rate, the vola-
tilities of flows into and out of the labor force are of roughly the same magnitude as 
are the much studied flows between employment and unemployment. Second, the 
cyclical properties of some of these flows seem counterintuitive; for example, the 
transition rate from unemployment to nonparticipation is procyclical despite the fact 
that the participation rate is procyclical.
We then build a model in which households are subject to idiosyncratic shocks 
in the presence of incomplete credit and insurance markets and labor market fric-
tions, i.e., job-loss and job-finding rates. Our specification allows for endogenous 
search effort while non-employed, on-the-job search, heterogeneous match quality, 
and an unemployment insurance (UI) system that reflects key features of the US 
system. Aggregating across heterogeneous households yields a model of aggregate 
labor supply in the presence of frictions. The steady state of the model features 
flows across labor market states from one period to the next. An important part of 
our work is to show that it is possible to calibrate the model to yield a close match 
between the average flows in the US data and those in the model, something which 
previous models have been unable to do.
We then subject our model to aggregate shocks to the extent of labor market 
frictions, i.e., job-finding rates and job-loss rates, and examine the implications for 
the cyclical patterns in gross worker flows. We find that our benchmark model with 
shocks to frictions does a good job of accounting for the key features of fluctuations 
in gross worker flows between the three labor market states. In particular, it accounts 
for the fact that the participation rate fluctuates much less than the unemployment 
and employment rates and is less highly correlated with output, as well as generat-
ing large fluctuations in the flows into and out of the labor force that have the same 
pattern of cyclical correlations as found in the data.1
The weak procyclical nature of the participation rate reflects two forces that are 
close to offsetting in our analysis: a wealth effect that decreases the desire to partic-
ipate in good times, and an intertemporal substitution effect that creates an incentive 
for additional search during good times. Although our model features a constant 
wage per efficiency unit of labor, a standard intertemporal labor supply channel 
nonetheless emerges due to the fact that higher job-to-job flows during good times 
1 As Shimer (2013) demonstrates, a model that provides a good match with the data in the cyclical behavior of 
the flows between unemployment and employment does not necessarily fit the cyclical pattern of labor force partic-
ipation once it is extended to incorporate the participation margin. 
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imply that wages for individual workers increase more rapidly during good times. 
In our model, flows between participation and nonparticipation account for almost 
one third of fluctuations in the unemployment rate, consistent with the empirical 
findings in Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2015).
Changes in the composition of individuals in the unemployment pool play a key 
role in explaining how our model accounts for the patterns of correlations for the 
flows into and out of the labor force. In particular, during good times the unemploy-
ment pool is more heavily populated by individuals who are closer to being indiffer-
ent between participating and not-participating, and as a result there is an increase in 
the rate at which workers transition from unemployment to nonparticipation.
Our paper is related to several strands in the literature. One of these is the litera-
ture on gross flows.2 Another is the literature on individual labor supply in the pres-
ence of frictions. Ham (1982) was an early effort to rigorously study unemployment 
in a labor supply setting, showing that unemployment spells could not be interpreted 
as optimal labor supply responses. Consistent with his findings, our model features 
both an operative labor supply margin and unemployment, and unemployment is 
a departure from desired labor supply. More recently, Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri 
(2010) study life-cycle labor supply in the presence of frictions. Our study is very 
much in the spirit of theirs, though because our focus is on aggregate effects over 
the business cycle, our individuals are described in a more stylized manner (without 
regard to age, etc.). Our own earlier work, e.g., Krusell et al. (2010), is even more 
stylized and only looks at mechanisms in steady states, whereas the present paper is 
focused entirely on aggregate fluctuations.3
A third strand is a recent literature that extends general equilibrium business 
cycle models of employment and unemployment to allow for a participation deci-
sion.4 The key feature that distinguishes our paper from these is our focus on gross 
worker flows—these papers only consider labor market stocks. In addition, our 
model improves upon labor supply models with household heterogeneity—such as 
in Chang and Kim (2006)—by introducing a labor market with realistic features.
An outline of the paper follows. In the next section we document the key business 
cycle facts for gross worker flows among the three labor market states for the United 
States over the period 1978–2012. Section II describes our theoretical framework 
and explains how we calibrate it. Section III examines the cyclical performance of 
the model. Section IV concludes.
2 This includes, for example, Abowd and Zellner (1985); Poterba and Summers (1986); Blanchard and Diamond 
(1990); Davis and Haltiwanger (1992); Fujita and Ramey (2009); Shimer (2012); and Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin 
(2015). 
3 Our earlier work is significantly less detailed: it does not have UI, costly search, match quality, nor on-the- 
job search. Our modeling of search costs here, moreover, allows us to fit the steady state flows significantly better. 
Finally, note that due to the nonlinearity of our model, with wealth effects, cutoff decision rules, etc., it is not suffi-
cient to make steady state comparisons as a way to understand how cyclical movements are generated. 
4 These include Tripier (2004); Veracierto (2008); Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010); Galí, Smets, and 
Wouters (2011); Ebell (2011); Haefke and Reiter (2011); and Shimer (2013). 
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I. Worker Flows over the Business Cycle
In this section, we document the business cycle facts for gross worker flows using 
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the period 1978:I–2012:III.5 The 
flow rates are calculated for all respondents and are not only restricted to household 
heads. Further details regarding the data sources and the construction of labor mar-
ket flows are provided in online Appendix A.1.
A model that successfully accounts for the behavior of gross worker flows will 
necessarily account for the behavior of net flows and hence the three labor mar-
ket stocks— E (employment),  U (unemployment), and  N (not in the labor force)—
though not vice versa. It follows that matching the behavior of the three labor market 
stocks is a less stringent test of a model. Because it is much simpler to describe the 
behavior of the stocks and they are subject to less measurement error, we think it is 
useful to examine the properties of both the stocks and the flows in the models that 
we consider.
To begin our analysis, Table 1 presents summary statistics from the data for the 
business cycle properties for the stocks.6 We use  u to denote the unemployment rate, 
U/(E + U ) ,  lfpr to denote the labor force participation rate,  (E + U )/(E + U + N ) , 
and  Y for GDP. 
The resulting patterns are relatively well known: employment is strongly procy-
clical, and the unemployment rate is strongly countercyclical. Although the labor 
force participation rate is procyclical, it is not as strongly cyclical as the other two 
series. The unemployment rate is the most volatile of the three series, and the labor 
force participation rate is the least volatile. All three series are highly autocorrelated. 
The fact that the participation rate fluctuates relatively little compared to either the 
employment rate or the unemployment rate might lead one to conclude that move-
ments into and out of the labor force are not of first-order importance in understand-
ing fluctuations in the unemployment rate. However, this conclusion confuses the 
role of net flows with the role of gross flows. We now turn to look at the behavior of 
gross flows, and will see that the small fluctuations in net flows into and out of the 
labor force mask large fluctuations in the gross flows into and out of the labor force.
We estimate gross flows using matched CPS data for the period 1978:I–2012:III 
following an algorithm similar to that used elsewhere.7 While some of the patterns 
5 We restrict attention to 1978:I–2012:III since this is the period for which we have consistent data on adjusted 
gross flows. 
6 The cyclical components in Table 1 and Table 3 are isolated using an HP-filter with a smoothing parameter of 
1,600 applied to the log of quarterly averages of monthly data. 
7 In particular, see Blanchard and Diamond (1990); Fujita and Ramey (2009); Shimer (2012); and Elsby, 
Hobijn, and Şahin (2015). 
Table 1—Cyclical Properties of Stocks, 1978:I–2012:III
 u  lfpr  E 
 std(x )  0.1170  0.0026  0.0099 
 corr(x, Y )  − 0.84  0.21  0.83 
 corr (x,  x −1 )  0.93  0.69  0.92 
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that we highlight have been documented in previous work (see, e.g., Blanchard and 
Diamond 1990 and Shimer 2012), some details vary across studies and it is import-
ant that we have a consistent set of statistics for the exercises we carry out later.8
An important concern when analyzing gross flows data is the possibility of classi-
fication error. Earlier research has found these errors to be substantial, especially for 
transitions between unemployment and nonparticipation.9 We implement a correc-
tion following Blanchard and Diamond (1990) and Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2015) 
to address this issue. In particular, we adjust the gross flows data using Abowd and 
Zellner’s (1985) estimates of misclassification probabilities based on resolved labor 
force status in CPS reinterview surveys. Table 2 shows the average values of quar-
terly transition rates for the 1978:I–2012:III period with and without the Abowd-
Zellner correction; in the table,  f ij denotes the fraction of workers that move from 
state  i in the previous period to state  j in the current period.10
Table 2 reveals that the adjusted flows using Abowd and Zellner’s estimates of 
misclassification probabilities are systematically below their unadjusted counter-
parts. Put differently, all three labor market states are more persistent than predicted 
by unadjusted flow rates. As noted in the prior literature, flows that involve non-
participation are affected much more than other flows. Transition rates between 
employment and nonparticipation are approximately halved, while those between 
unemployment and nonparticipation are adjusted down by around one third.
An alternative adjustment, suggested by Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2015), involves 
recoding sequences of recorded labor market states to eliminate  high-frequency 
reversals of transitions between unemployment and nonparticipation. This pro-
cedure identifies individuals whose measured labor market state cycles back and 
forth between unemployment and nonparticipation from month to month and omits 
8 Differences include the method used to identify cyclical components, the time period and whether to report 
statistics for flows of workers as opposed to transition rates. For example, Blanchard and Diamond (1990) focus on 
the component of the time series that is accounted for by what they call “aggregate demand shocks,” whereas we 
focus on the cyclical component as identified using the HP filter. They consider the time period 1968–1986, whereas 
we consider 1978:I–2012:III, and we characterize transition rates, whereas they characterize the level of flows. This 
last feature can make some properties appear different. For example, whereas the transition rate from  U to  E (which 
we denote as  f UE ) is strongly procyclical, the fact that the size of the unemployment pool is also countercyclical 
implies that the level of the  U to  E flow is actually countercyclical. 
9 See, for example, Abowd and Zellner (1985); Poterba and Summers (1986); Chua and Fuller (1987); and 
Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2015). 
10 We do not make any correction for time aggregation when reporting statistics for the flows. Our model will 
explicitly allow for some time aggregation, so the statistics in Table 2 will be the appropriate ones for comparing 
with the values generated by our model. We note, however, that with time aggregation corrections, none of the quali-
tative patterns that we comment on below change. Shimer (2013) examines these flows using data that are corrected 
for time aggregation but finds the same cyclical properties as we do. 
Table 2—Gross Worker Flows, 1978:I–2012:III 
Unadjusted data Abowd-Zellner correction De NUN  ified data
From To From To From To
 E  U  N  E  U  N  E  U  N 
 E  0.957  0.015  0.028  E 0.972 0.014 0.014  E  0.957  0.015  0.028 
 U 0.254 0.535 0.211  U 0.228 0.637 0.135  U  0.263  0.592  0.146 
 N 0.047 0.028 0.925  N 0.022 0.021 0.957  N  0.048  0.019  0.933 
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such transitions (“de NUN ification”). For example, a respondent who reported 
a sequence of labor market states of  NUN is recoded as being a nonparticipant 
 NNN . Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2015) show that this correction results in transi-
tion rates between unemployment and nonparticipation that are quite similar to the 
adjusted rates based on the Abowd and Zellner (1985) estimates. The average values 
of the  f UN and  f NU transition rates with the adjusted data using de NUN ification were 
0.146 and  0.019 , respectively. These values are similar to the corresponding Abowd-
Zellner adjusted data ( 0.135 and  0.022 ). In the remainder of our paper, we will use 
the average transition flow rates, as well as labor market stocks, adjusted using the 
Abowd-Zellner estimates of misclassification as our benchmark to assess the per-
formance of our model, though we will refer to both adjustments when we evaluate 
the cyclical performance of our model. 
Next we turn to the cyclical behavior of the gross flows. Table 3 presents sum-
mary statistics from the data for the business cycle properties for gross flows using 
the unadjusted data as well as the Abowd-Zellner adjusted and de NUN ified flows 
data. The series are quarterly, produced by taking the quarterly average of monthly 
series, and all series are then logged and HP filtered. 
We focus our discussion of this table around four basic observations. First, 
although as noted previously the stock of nonparticipants does not vary much over 
the business cycle relative to the other two stocks, Table 3 shows that the flows 
between nonparticipation and the other states exhibit large movements at business 
cycle frequencies. Specifically, whereas the fluctuations in the participation rate are 
an order of magnitude smaller than the fluctuations in the unemployment rate, the 
fluctuations in the transition rates into and out of nonparticipation are of roughly the 
same order of magnitude as those in the much-studied flows between  E and  U . For 
example, looking only at the two flow rates into employment,  f UE and  f NE , one would 
not be led to conclude that the participation rate plays only a minor role in account-
ing for employment fluctuations. The reason that the labor force participation rate 
does not move more over the cycle is because of the offsetting effect of an increased 
U -to- N transition rate during good times.
Second, consistently with the earlier work of Blanchard and Diamond (1990), the 
U and  N states are not observationally equivalent. For example, whereas the flow 
Table 3—Cyclical Properties of Gross Worker Flows 
  f EU   f EN   f UE   f UN   f NE   f NU 
Panel A. Unadjusted data
 std(x )  0.075  0.033  0.077  0.053  0.041  0.064 
 corr (x, Y )  −0.70  0.35  0.79  0.66  0.61  −0.70 
 corr (x,  x −1 )  0.69  0.22  0.82  0.71  0.52  0.78 
Panel B. Abowd-Zellner (AZ ) correction
 std(x )  0.089  0.083  0.088  0.106  0.103  0.072 
 corr (x, Y )  −0.63  0.43  0.76  0.61  0.52  −0.23 
 corr (x,  x −1 )  0.59  0.29  0.75  0.62  0.38  0.30 
Panel C. De NUN ified data
 std(x )  0.069  0.036  0.076  0.066  0.041  0.063 
 corr (x, Y )  −0.66  0.29  0.81  0.55  0.57  −0.56 
 corr (x,  x −1 )  0.70  0.22  0.85  0.58  0.48  0.57 
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rate from  E into  U is strongly countercyclical, the flow rate from  E into  N is weakly 
procyclical.
Third, some of the cyclical properties revealed in Table 3 might reasonably be 
viewed as counterintuitive. For example, although the participation rate increases 
during good times, both of the flow rates out of participation,  f EN and  f UN , actually 
increase during good times.
Fourth, the fact that the  U -to- N flow rate decreases during recessions is contrary 
to an apparent piece of conventional wisdom that holds that unemployed workers 
are more likely to become discouraged during bad times. Note that this is not incon-
sistent with the fact that the stock of discouraged workers is higher during reces-
sions: even with a constant flow rate between unemployment and discouragement, 
the fact that the stock of unemployment is higher in recessions will also imply that 
the stock of discouraged workers is higher.
The cyclicality of flows are very similar for each of the two misclassification 
adjustments we considered. However, applying the misclassification adjustment 
following the estimates of Abowd and Zellner increases the volatility of the flow 
rates involving nonparticipation considerably while the de NUN ification process 
does not result in a notable change for the volatility of these flow rates. This is 
consistent with the type of adjustment that the two correction procedures involve. 
The Abowd-Zellner correction is a time-invariant correction method that applies 
the correction probabilities to any occurrence of the state  N while de NUN ification 
applies the correction to the high frequency reversals between  N and  U . When 
we compare models to the data, we will report comparisons with the data 
adjusted using both methods to provide a better assessment of the performance 
of our models.
For future reference we note a related finding in the recent work by Elsby, Hobijn, 
and Şahin (2015). They find that the composition of the unemployment pool shifts 
toward more attached workers during recessions; this factor accounts for around 
75 percent of the decline in the  U -to- N transition rate during recessions. The most 
important dimension of attachment turns out to be prior employment status. This 
feature will be present in the quantitative model that we study. Moreover, our rel-
atively parsimonious model will deliver natural explanations for all of the patterns 
just documented.
II. Labor Supply and Gross Worker Flows
Our core model is one of individual consumption and labor supply in the pres-
ence of imperfectly insurable uncertainty and job-finding frictions. The individual 
is subject to a variety of shocks. Some of these shocks are shared by other agents 
(they are aggregate shocks), whereas others are purely idiosyncratic. Through the 
budgets, prices—notably the wage per efficiency unit of labor and interest rate—
appear, and we assume that all agents face the same prices. Moreover, we take 
these prices as exogenous. Thus, our strategy is to solve for individual behavior 
given prices and then aggregate across the population, taking into account that 
some shocks are shared. Our focus is on how labor supply decisions are made 
across the population and we do not require that prices clear the labor market at 
all points in time: we solve for a partial equilibrium. However, as we explain in 
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detail below, the prices we do subject the agents to are calibrated so as to clear 
markets on average.11
Our setting blends together the Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari heterogeneous-agent 
assumptions to model consumption choice with a search model restricting the indi-
vidual’s ability to choose in the labor market. The latter incorporates search both on 
and off the job. Overall, our aim is for the modeling as well as the calibration to be 
standard and in line with the large associated literatures. Thus, we did not design 
the model to deliver certain outcomes for our focus of analysis: how the gross flows 
across labor market states change over the business cycle.
Thus, consider an individual with preferences given by
  E t  ∑ 
t=0
∞
  β t [log ( c t ) − α e t − γ  s t ] ,
where  c t ≥ 0 is consumption in period  t ,  e t ∈ { 0, 1} is employment status in period 
t , and  s t ∈ { 0, 1} is a discrete variable that reflects whether the individual engages 
in active job search in period  t . The parameters  α > 0, γ > 0 are the disutilities of 
work and active search, respectively, and  0 < β < 1 is the discount factor. A key 
element of our model is that an individual’s (net) return from work in the market is 
stochastic. In reality the relevant shocks could influence both the reward to market 
work and the opportunity cost of market work, but since it is ultimately the relative 
value of market work that matters, we capture this with a single shock, which we 
model as an idiosyncratic shock to market productivity,  z t . We assume it follows an 
AR(1) process in logs:
  log  z t+1 =  ρ z log  z t +  ε t+1 ,
where the innovation  ε t+1 is a mean zero, normally distributed random variable with 
standard deviation  σ ε .12
The traditional literature on individual labor supply assumes that the relevant 
market conditions faced by an individual are prices, most notably the wage rate 
( w ) and the interest rate ( r ). A key innovation of our labor supply model is to expand 
the set of market conditions to also include four parameters ( λ u ,  λ n ,  λ e , and  σ ) that 
describe labor market frictions. We will refer to  λ u ,  λ n , and  λ e as employment oppor-
tunity arrival rates:  λ u is the probability that a non-employed individual who engages 
in active search receives an employment opportunity,  λ n is the probability that a 
non-employed individual who does not engage in active search receives an employ-
ment opportunity, and  λ e is the probability that an employed individual receives an 
additional employment opportunity with another employer. The subscripts  u and  n 
reflect the fact that active search will determine whether an individual is counted as 
11 In an earlier version of the paper, we also closed the general-equilibrium side of the model, which requires 
assumptions on how prices and frictions are determined. Under the assumptions we made, it turned out that the 
results were very similar to those obtained in the corresponding partial equilibrium analysis. See Krusell et al. 
(2012). 
12 Because  z is mean-reverting, some movements in the return to market work will be predictable whereas some 
will not. A richer model would include more detail, perhaps with part of the predictable component reflecting age 
effects, and with multiple random components that differ in persistence. We view our approach as a parsimonious 
first step. 
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unemployed or not in the labor force. The parameter  σ is the employment separation 
rate and is the probability that an individual employed in period  t − 1 loses his or 
her job at the beginning of period  t . We collect the aggregate variables into a vector, 
Λ ≡ (w, r,  λ u ,  λ n ,  λ e , σ ) , that follows a law of motion over time. We describe how 
we calibrate this law of motion in the sections below.
A salient feature of the data on gross worker flows that we presented in the pre-
vious section is that even after cleaning the data to remove spurious flows, there 
remain large movements of non-employed individuals between active and pas-
sive search. To capture this in our model we assume that the disutility of active 
search,  γ , is random. In our calibrated model we assume that draws are  iid over 
time and distributed according to a three-point distribution with mean  γ ̅ and support 
 { γ ̅ −  ε γ ,  γ ̅,  γ ̅ +  ε γ } with equal probability at each point.
An employed worker’s labor earnings are the product of three components: the 
market wage per efficiency unit of labor services ( w ), the idiosyncratic worker com-
ponent  z described above, and a match quality component ( q ). Whenever an indi-
vidual receives an employment opportunity, it is accompanied by a realization of 
the match quality  q , which is an  iid draw from a log normal distribution with mean 
0 and standard deviation  σ q . This value is fixed for the duration of the match and is 
observed at the time the employment opportunity is received.
There is a UI program, specified so as to capture key features of the UI system in 
the United States while also maintaining tractability. To be eligible for UI, a worker 
must have previously been employed and experienced an employment separation 
shock. That is, individuals who leave employment by choice are not eligible. In 
order to be eligible to receive benefits, we assume that an individual needs to engage 
in active search. Although we implicitly assume that the UI authority can monitor 
search activity, we do not assume that the UI authority can observe any received 
employment opportunities, so the receipt of benefits imposes no restrictions on an 
individual’s decision to accept an employment opportunity. To capture the fact that 
UI benefits have finite duration while minimizing the state space, we assume that an 
eligible individual loses eligibility each period with probability  μ . We will represent 
a non-employed individual’s eligibility status by the indicator variable  I B , with the 
convention that a value of one indicates eligibility. Another feature of the UI system 
in the United States is that benefits are related to past earnings, subject to a cap. To 
capture this we assume that an individual’s UI benefit is a linear function of his or 
her idiosyncratic shock  z , up to a maximum of  b ̅.13 Formally,
  b(z )  =  { 





We assume a market structure that is standard in the incomplete markets litera-
ture. The individual cannot borrow and there are no markets for insuring idiosyn-
cratic risk, but can accumulate an asset, whose level we denote by  a , and offers a 
rate of return given by  r . To capture the presence of various transfer programs that 
implicitly provide some insurance, we assume that there is a proportional tax  τ on 
13 We index benefits to  z rather than past earnings in order to economize on the state space while still allowing 
for feedback from market opportunities to UI benefits. 
3456 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW NOVEMbER 2017
labor earnings and a lump sum transfer  T . Combining these features, the individual’s 
period budget equation is given by
  c t +  a t+1 = (1 + r )  a t + (1 − τ ) w  z  t  q t  e t + (1 −  e t )  I t B  s t (1 − τ ) b(  z t ) + T ,
where, as above,  e t ∈ { 0, 1} is the employment indicator.
Next we describe how events unfold within a period. At the beginning of period 
t an individual will observe new realizations for  z, γ,  I B , and  Λ . To detail the sub-
sequent events we need to distinguish individuals according to three scenarios. In 
the first scenario, the individual was not employed in the previous period and did 
not receive an employment opportunity while searching. In the second scenario, the 
individual was not employed in the previous period but did receive an employment 
opportunity and associated match quality while searching. In the third scenario, the 
individual was employed in the previous period.
We begin with the individual in the first scenario. Having received new realiza-
tions for  z ,  γ ,  I B , and  Λ , this individual chooses whether to engage in active or pas-
sive search and makes a consumption-saving decision. Following these decisions, 
the outcome of search will be realized. If the individual receives an employment 
opportunity (and an associated draw of match quality) he or she will enter period 
t + 1 as an individual in scenario two.
Next consider an individual who enters the current period in scenario two. This 
individual begins the period with an employment opportunity in hand. If the indi-
vidual accepts the employment opportunity they will work this period, receive labor 
earnings, make a consumption-savings decision, and enter the subsequent period as 
an individual in scenario three. If the individual chooses to reject the employment 
opportunity, they are now identical to an individual who entered the period under 
scenario one, and once again makes choices about search effort, consumption, and 
saving.
Finally, we consider an individual who enters the period in scenario three. 
In the process of transiting from the previous period to the beginning of this 
period we allow for two types of developments. First, we implicitly assume that 
employed workers engage in passive search and hence may receive additional 
employment opportunities. Second, as noted earlier, we allow for the possibility 
that past employment positions are destroyed, causing the worker to be separated. 
While there are various ways that one could formulate the joint outcomes, we 
assume that this individual experiences one of four mutually exclusive events as 
follows. With probability  1 − σ −  λ e the individual retains the previous employ-
ment opportunity and does not receive an additional opportunity. With probabil-
ity  λ e the individual retains the previous opportunity but also receives an additional 
employment opportunity with an  iid draw from the match quality distribution. 
With probability  σ  λ u the individual is separated from the previous employment 
opportunity but receives a new employment opportunity with a new draw from 
the match quality distribution.14 Lastly, with probability  σ(1 −  λ u ) the individual 
14 We interpret these individuals as the very short-term unemployed, who find a job within the month of sep-
aration, which is the main reason we use  λ u for the probability of a new offer. Alternatively, we could have set 
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is separated from the previous employment position and does not simultaneously 
receive a new employment opportunity.
In the event that the individual has only one employment opportunity, the situa-
tion is identical to scenario two. In the event that the individual has two employment 
opportunities, it is optimal to take the one with the higher match quality and discard 
the other, at which point the individual again is in scenario two. Note that the combi-
nation of on-the-job search and heterogeneous match quality implies that our model 
features a job ladder in which employed individuals tend to transition to higher pay-
ing jobs over time. Finally, an individual who is separated and has no employment 
opportunity is identical to an individual in scenario one.
We express the individual’s decision problem recursively. We formulate the prob-
lem at the point where all new shocks have been realized, so that the individual 
knows the current value of  z , the current value of  γ , whether they have an employ-
ment opportunity and if so the value of the match quality, the current UI eligibility 
status, and the assets brought into the period.
An individual without an employment opportunity (i.e., what we called sce-
nario one above) decides both whether to engage in active or passive search and 
on consumption versus saving. Let  U(a, z, γ,  I B , Λ ) and  N(a, z, γ,  I B , Λ ) denote the 
Bellman values for such an individual conditional upon active search (i.e., unem-
ployed) and passive search (i.e., out of the labor force), respectively. An individual 
in this “jobless” situation will have a value denoted by  J(a, z, γ,  I B , Λ ) that is simply 
the maximum of these two options:
  J(a, z, γ,  I B , Λ ) =  max 
 
  { U(a, z, γ,  I B , Λ ), N(a, z, γ,  I B , Λ ) }. 
An individual with an employment opportunity (i.e., what we called scenario 
two above) has an additional decision: whether to accept or reject the employment 
opportunity. An individual who rejects the employment opportunity will become 
identical to an individual who did not have an employment opportunity, and hence 
receive the value  J(a, z, γ,  I B , Λ ) . Let  W(a, z, q,  I B , Λ ) denote the Bellman value 
for an individual who accepts an employment opportunity. An individual with an 
employment opportunity will choose the maximum of these two values, which we 
will denote by  V(a, z, q, γ,  I B , Λ ) :
  V(a, z, q, γ,  I B , Λ )  =  max 
 
  { W(a, z, q,  I B , Λ ) , J(a, z, γ,  I B , Λ ) }. 
this probability equal to  σ  λ e , on the grounds that a separating worker has the same chance of getting an outside 
offer within the period as does a non-separating worker. As a practical matter this makes little difference, but our 
choice captures the possibility that a separating worker may be able to generate additional offers through contacts 
(our calibration will have  λ u >  λ e ). More generally we could have introduced another independent parameter to 
capture this probability. 
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Having developed the notation for all of these Bellman values we can now write 
out the individual Bellman equations that define these values. Working backward 
from the end of the period decisions, the Bellman equation for  W is given by
 W(a, z, q,  I B , Λ) =  max 
c≥0,  a ′ ≥0
   {ln c − α + β E  z ′ ,  q ′ ,  γ ′ ,  Λ ′  [(1 − σ −  λ e )V(a′, z′, q, γ ′, 0, Λ′ ) 
 +  λ e V(a′, z′, max { q, q′ }, γ ′, 0, Λ′ )
       +  σ { (1 −  λ u )J(a′, z′, γ ′, 1, Λ′ ) 
    +  λ u V(a′, z′, q′, γ ′, 1, Λ′ )} ] } 
subject to
  c + a′ = (1 + r ) a + (1 − τ ) wzq + T. 
The future terms on the right-hand side reflect the four mutually exclusive events 
discussed previously that can transpire between the end of this period and the begin-
ning of the following period for an individual who works today.
Next consider the Bellman equations for active and passive search. For active 
search we have
 U(a, z, γ,  I B , Λ )  
  =  max 
c≥0,  a ′ ≥0
   {ln c − γ + β  E  z ′ ,  q ′ ,  γ ′ ,  I B ′,  Λ ′  [  λ u V(a′, z′, q′, γ ′,  I B ′, Λ′ ) 
 + (1 −  λ u )J(a′, z′, γ ′,  I B ′, Λ′ ) ] } 
subject to
  c + a′ = (1 + r ) a + (1 − τ )  I B b(z )  + T, 
and for passive search we have
 N(a, z, γ,  I B , Λ) =  max 
c≥0,  a ′ ≥0
   {ln c + β  E  z ′ ,  q ′ ,  I B ′,  Λ ′  [ λ n V(a′, z′, q′, γ ′,  I B ′ , Λ′ ) 
 + (1 −  λ n )J(a′, z′, γ ′,  I B ′, Λ′ ) ] } 
subject to
  c + a′ = (1 + r ) a + T. 
Our model provides a clear mapping to the data with regard to classifying a 
worker as either employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force. Specifically, 
an individual who works in period  t is labeled as employed. An individual who is 
not employed in period  t but engages in active search during period  t is labeled as 
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 unemployed. The residual category, an individual who is not employed in period  t 
and does not engage in active search, is labeled as out of the labor force.
To generate implications for aggregate gross worker flows we assume that there 
are a large number of workers, each of whom is just like the individual described 
above, with all of the shock realizations being  iid across individuals. Given a set 
of market conditions (i.e., prices and frictions), we can then look for a stationary 
distribution of individuals. In this stationary distribution there is an invariant distri-
bution of individuals over the individual state variables, an invariant distribution of 
individuals over the three labor market states (employment, unemployment, and out 
of the labor force), and an invariant distribution over gross flows.15
A. Calibrating the Stationary Distribution
This section describes our procedure for calibrating the parameters of our model 
so that the stationary distribution with constant market conditions matches the gross 
worker flows in the data. The numerical solution methods are explained in online 
Appendix A.2.
The model has a large number of parameters that need to be assigned: preference 
parameters  β ,  α ,  γ ̅, and  ε γ , idiosyncratic productivity shock parameters  ρ z and  σ ε , 
the variance of the match quality shock  σ q , frictional parameters ( σ ,  λ u ,  λ e , and  λ n ), 
the tax rate  τ , the transfer  T , the parameters of the UI system ( b ,  b ̅ , and  μ ), and 
prices ( r and  w ). Because data on labor market transitions are available monthly, we 
set the length of a period to be one month.
Several parameters are set without solving the model. We calibrate the shock 
process  z to estimates of idiosyncratic wage shocks, and so assume an AR(1) pro-
cess, with  ρ z = 0.996 and  σ ε = 0.096 . Aggregated to an annual level this would 
correspond to persistence of  0.955 and a standard deviation of  0.20 , which we take 
as representative values from this literature.16 Note that the tax rate on labor income 
is inconsequential, since it effectively amounts to a renormalization of the wage. We 
introduce it as a way to generate the revenue for the lump-sum transfer and UI system 
in an internally consistent manner. In line with various studies, we set  τ = 0.30 .17 
The lump sum transfer  T will be set so that the government budget balances in 
steady state equilibrium.
The parameters of the UI benefit system are chosen as follows. First, the param-
eter  μ is set to  1/6 so that the average duration of benefits is equal to six months. 
We set the cap on benefits to be  46.5 percent of the average wage in our steady state 
equilibrium. In our model, all exogenously separated individuals are eligible for UI 
15 Although we only analyze the labor supply side of the market, we note that our framework is consistent 
with a general equilibrium model that features two islands, one associated with employment (work island) and 
the other associated with nonemployment (leisure island). The work island consists of many districts, each with a 
constant returns to scale production function using capital and labor. In this setup, the productivity  z is attached to 
a worker and follows them as they move across districts. The match quality shock  q is worker-district specific. Free 
mobility of capital implies that the marginal product of capital is equated across districts, which because of constant 
returns to scale will also imply that the efficiency wage per unit of labor is also equated across districts. See online 
Appendix A.9 for details. 
16 See, for example, estimates in Card (1994), Floden and Linde (2001), and French (2005). 
17 Following the work of Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) there are several papers which produce estimates 
of the average effective tax rate on labor income across countries. Minor variations in methods across these studies 
produce small differences in the estimates, but  0.30 is representative of their estimates. 
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and will collect if they are unemployed and search actively. In reality, many exog-
enously separated individuals may either not be eligible or choose not to apply. We 
therefore set our replacement rate  b so that total UI payments in steady state is in 
line with the data. Over the 1978:I–2012:III period, total UI payments are  0.75  per-
cent of total compensation. We use a replacement rate of  0.23 , which results in total 
UI payments of  0.74 percent of total earnings.
The remaining parameters are chosen so that the steady state equilibrium matches 
specific targets. Although this amounts to a large set of nonlinear equations which is 
solved jointly, we think it is informative to describe the calibration as a few distinct 
steps.
We begin with the five parameters  α ,  γ ̅,  σ ,  λ u , and  λ n . We discipline the value 
of  γ ̅ relative to the value of  α based on measures of search time relative to working 
time. In particular, since average time devoted to search for unemployed workers 
is approximately  3.5 hours per week in the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) 
according to Mukoyama, Patterson, and Şahin (forthcoming), and average hours of 
work for employed individuals are approximately  40 , we set  γ ̅ =  3.5 ___40 α . Intuitively, 
holding all else constant, the disutility from working  α will directly affect the desire 
of individuals to work and hence exerts a direct influence on the employment rate. 
The gap between  λ u and  λ n will influence how the non-employed are split between 
active and passive search. For a given gap, the level of  λ n will directly impact on 
the flow from  N to  E . And the value of  σ will intuitively have a direct impact on the 
flow from  E into  U . Accordingly, we set the values of  α ,  σ ,  λ u , and  λ n so as to match 
the labor force participation rate ( 0.66 ), the unemployment rate ( 0.068 ), the  E -to- U 
flow rate ( 0.014 ), and the  N -to- E flow rate ( 0.022 ). All these values are averages 
from 1978:I to 2012:III.
The two parameters  λ e and  σ q will directly impact the nature of job-to-job transi-
tions in the model. Accordingly, we set these two values so as to match a job-to-job 
transition rate of  2.2 percent per month (from the Current Population Survey, using 
the tabulation of Fallick and Fleischman 2004 for 1994:I to 2012:III) and an average 
wage gain upon experiencing a job-to-job transition of  3.3 percent (from Tjaden and 
Wellschmied 2014).
The final preference parameter to be determined is  ε γ , which governs the variation 
in the disutility associated with active search. This parameter plays a very specific 
role in terms of allowing our model to match the patterns in gross worker flows. As 
noted previously, a key feature of the gross flow data is that even after correcting for 
potential spurious flows due to misclassification, there are still large flows between 
U and  N . Taking these flows at face value, they suggest important temporary shocks 
that influence the decisions of non-employed individuals. We generate these flows 
by assuming a shock to the disutility of active search. While this could reflect real 
demands on an individual’s time that make search more costly, it could also reflect 
psychological effects associated with the job search process. We set  ε γ so as to 
match this aspect of the gross flow data.
While our subsequent analysis is partial equilibrium, we impose that our steady 
state values for  r and  w are consistent with factor prices generated from a Cobb-
Douglas aggregate production function with capital share parameter equal to  0.30 
assuming factor inputs are those implied by our steady state model. We set  β so 
that the return to capital  (1 + r) derived from the background general equilibrium 
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model is  1.00327 ( 1.04 in annual value). This leads us to  β = 0.99465 . This value 
of  r implies  w = 2.48 . The government budget balance condition then implies that 
T = 1.36 . 
Table 4 summarizes values for the calibrated parameter values and Table 5 dis-
plays the implications for steady state gross flows in our calibrated model, as well 
as the corresponding average values for these flows for the United States over the 
period 1978:I–2012:III. We report the  95 percent confidence intervals for the flow 
rates in the data that were calculated using bootstrapping on the microdata. Further 
details regarding data sources and the construction of labor market flows are pro-
vided in online Appendix A.1. 
While the nonlinear nature of the model prevents a perfect match to the gross 
flow data given the number of free parameters and the additional moments being 
matched, Table 5 indicates that the model does a very good job of matching the 
gross flows found in the data. All flow rates lie within the 95 percent confidence 
intervals for the flow rates. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first structural 
model to present such a close fit to these data. Previous work has not been able to 
provide such a close match to the flows between unemployment and nonparticipa-
tion, and since flows must sum to one, these earlier studies have necessarily missed 
on the other flows as well.
Gross Flows by Wealth.—The previous discussion focused on the ability of the 
calibrated model to match the aggregate gross flows data. The model also has pre-
dictions for these flows conditioned on individual state variables. In particular, the 
model makes predictions for the pattern of gross flows by wealth. The CPS does 
not contain data on wealth, so here we exploit the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) to assess the model’s predictions regarding the relationship 
between gross flows and wealth.
The SIPP consists of a collection of multi-year panels. Within a panel, respon-
dents are interviewed three times per year about the previous four months. Panels 
Table 4—Calibration
Parameter values
 β  ρ z  σ ε  μ  α  γ ̅  λ u  λ n  σ  λ e  σ q  ε γ 
 0.99465  0.996  0.096  1/6  0.485  0.042  0.278  0.182  0.0178  0.121  0.034  0.030 
Table 5—Gross Worker Flows in the Data and the Model 
AZ-adjusted data Model
From To From To
 E  U  N  E  U  N 
 E  0.972 0.014 0.014  E  0.972  0.014  0.014 
 95% CI  (0.970, 0.974)  (0.013, 0.015)  (0.012, 0.015) 
 U 0.228 0.637 0.135  U  0.219  0.652  0.130 
 95% CI  (0.211, 0.246)  (0.616, 0.657)  (0.119, 0.152) 
 N 0.022 0.021 0.957  N  0.022  0.020  0.958 
 95% CI  (0.019, 0.025)  (0.018, 0.023)  (0.954, 0.960) 
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range in duration from two to four years. We use the 1990–2008 SIPP panels, which 
cover October 1989 through November 2013 with gaps. Between one and four times 
per panel, households report their assets, including checking and savings accounts, 
mutual funds, retirement accounts, and real estate. We approximate household 
wealth in each month using the most recent wealth measure. Similar to the CPS, 
the SIPP reports labor market status of respondents over a panel, which allows the 
calculations of individual worker transitions. Although the labor force status defini-
tions in the SIPP differ slightly from those in the CPS, we create a labor force status 
nearly analogous to the CPS. As is well known and discussed extensively in Fujita, 
Nekarda, and Ramey (2007), the flow rates computed using the CPS and SIPP differ 
in levels. Since our model is calibrated to the CPS data, we report the flow rates for 
each quintile relative to the overall average flow rates in Table 6 to make the com-
parison of the model with the data easier. 
Overall, the model does a reasonably good job of matching the qualitative fea-
tures found in the SIPP data. In particular, the  E to  U flow rate decreases with wealth 
both in the SIPP data and in our model. In the model this is driven by wealth effects: 
wealthy individuals who suffer a job loss are more likely to leave the labor force. 
The  E to  N flow rate is U-shaped with respect to wealth both in the SIPP data and 
in our model: workers in the upper and lower wealth quintiles are more likely to 
leave employment for nonparticipation. This pattern reflects two different reasons 
for leaving the labor force in the model. Workers in the lowest quintiles are typically 
the ones with low productivity making them leave the labor force, while at the high-
est wealth quintiles, the wealth effect is important in causing labor force withdrawal. 
These two forces are more stark in our model than they are in the data. The  U to  E 
flow rate, often referred to as the job-finding rate, is approximately flat with respect 
to wealth both in the model and in the data. The  N to  E flow rate decreases by wealth 
both in the data and in our model. Once again, in the model this is driven by wealth 
effects. Finally, we note that the job-to-job ( JJ ) flow rate decreases by wealth both 
in the data and in the model. In the model this is driven by the fact that employed 
individuals with high wealth are more likely to have higher quality matches, making 
job-to-job transitions less likely.18
18 Note that in Table 6,  EE refers to workers who continue to be employed regardless of changing jobs or not, 
while  JJ stands for job-to-job transitions. 
Table 6—Flow Rates by Wealth Quintile Relative to the Aggregate 
Data Model
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
 EU 1.82 1.15 0.87 0.70 0.54   EU 1.13 1.05 0.97 0.97 0.96
 EN 1.15 0.92 0.91 0.97 1.09   EN 4.54 1.24 0.54 0.63 0.72
 UE 0.88 1.08 1.04 1.10 1.06   UE 1.05 0.92 1.02 1.03 1.02
 UN 1.06 0.94 0.99 0.94 1.04   UN 1.54 1.04 0.81 0.87 0.80
 NE 1.05 1.34 0.99 0.89 0.84   NE 1.16 1.33 0.89 0.70 0.73
 NU 1.79 1.37 0.86 0.63 0.47   NU 0.73 1.87 1.11 0.88 0.83
 EE 0.95 0.99 1.01 1.02 1.02   EE 0.93 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01
 UU 1.07 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.91   UU 0.87 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.03
 NN 0.97 0.96 1.01 1.02 1.03   NN 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.01 1.01
 JJ 1.29 1.12 0.94 0.88 0.79   JJ 1.68 1.01 0.92 0.96 0.95
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Although the deviation is quantitatively small, the  UE rate exhibits a slight depar-
ture from the data: Q1 exhibits the lowest  UE rate in the data, while exhibiting the 
highest in the model. This results in the reverse pattern in  UU . Our view is that 
this departure comes from the parsimony of our model. For example, we assume 
that  λ u is homogeneous across workers. Once we add some heterogeneity in  λ u , as 
we observe for characteristics such as age and skills in the data, one could easily 
imagine that the workers in Q1 would end up having a somewhat lower  UE rate 
compared to the current version of the model.
Two other patterns which do not match qualitatively are the  U to  N flow rate 
and the  N to  U flow rate. The  U to  N flow rate is approximately flat with respect to 
wealth in the data while it is higher for workers with lower wealth in our model. In 
our model, unemployed individuals with low wealth are more likely to have entered 
unemployment from  N and so are close to the boundary between these two regions, 
making them more likely to transition to  N . The  N to  U flow rate decreases with 
wealth in the data, whereas in our model it is non-monotonic: consistent with the 
data it is decreasing after Q2, but it increases going from Q1 to Q2.
In addition to implications for gross flows by wealth, the model has detailed 
implications for asset accumulation and decumulation related to labor market status 
as well as for the distributions of wealth and productivity. We discuss these in some 
detail in online Appendix A.3 and argue that they are in line with empirical micro-
economic studies.
B. Calibrating the Aggregate Shocks
Our main goal is to examine the extent to which our labor supply model of gross 
worker flows can match the properties of fluctuations in Tables 1 and 3 when sub-
jected to empirically reasonable shocks to market conditions. We will assume that 
the only source of shocks is to frictions, i.e., we will assume that the two prices,  w 
and  r , remain constant. This is a natural starting point for this kind of analysis since 
many researchers, e.g., Hall (2005), have argued that a model in which wages are 
perfectly rigid offers a good account of labor demand movements in the sense that it 
accounts for cyclical movements in the job-finding rate in a model with a fixed labor 
force. Moreover, the state of the literature on wage cyclicality is still unsettled. We 
will thus take as given the fluctuations in frictions found in the data and ask whether 
such a model also provides a good account of labor market flows in a model that 
explicitly allows for an endogenous participation margin.
Modeling Shocks to Frictions.—There are a few different ways that we could 
proceed. One strategy would be to estimate the model using some type of simu-
lated moments estimator on time series data. We instead adopt a much simpler and, 
we think, more transparent approach that offers some important insights into the 
role that different driving forces play in shaping the cyclical properties of gross 
worker flows. Specifically, given that our focus is on business cycle fluctuations and 
that a key feature of business cycles is comovement among series, we effectively 
focus on perfectly correlated movements in market conditions that reflect business 
cycle movements. We then ask whether such movements can account for business 
cycle fluctuations in gross worker flows if the relative variances of the movements 
3464 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW NOVEMbER 2017
in each variable are set to empirically reasonable values. Intuitively, we want to 
consider shocks to labor demand that manifest themselves in fluctuations in fric-
tions. However, for our purposes, the ultimate source of labor demand shocks is 
immaterial and, indeed, the shocks we consider are consistent with a variety of such 
sources.
The simplest implementation of this method would posit a latent aggregate state  s 
that follows a Markov process, with prices and frictions all being functions of this 
latent aggregate state  s .19 As is common in the business cycle literature with hetero-
geneous agents, we assume that the shocks to market conditions follow a two-state 
Markov process. We will refer to one state as the “good” state (denoted by a super-
script  G ) and the other state as the “bad” state (denoted with a superscript  B ). The 
good state will have a high value for the employment arrival rates  λ u ,  λ e , and  λ n , and 
a low value for the employment separation rate  σ . We denote the two possible reali-
zations for the market conditions shock as  (  λ u G ,  λ n G ,  λ e G ,  σ G ) and  (  λ u B ,  λ n B ,  λ e B ,  σ B ) . 
We parameterize these shocks as  λ u G =  λ u ∗ +  ε λ ,  λ u B =  λ u ∗ −  ε λ ,  σ G =  σ ∗ −  ε σ , 
and  σ B =  σ ∗ +  ε σ , where  λ u ∗ and  σ ∗ are the values for the model calibrated to 
match average transition rates. We assume that movements in  λ e and  λ n are such as 
to maintain constant ratios relative to  λ u . We assume that the transition matrix for 
the Markov process is symmetric, with diagonal element denoted by  ρ .
In our model, both the level and fluctuations in  f UE closely mimic the level and 
fluctuations in  λ u . For this reason we choose the value of  ε λ so that the fluctuations 
in  f UE in the simulated model match the standard deviation of the fluctuations in  f UE 
found in US data. This leads to  ε λ = 0.0662 . Given values for the  λ i s , which influ-
ences the impact of time aggregation on measured  f EU , the level and fluctuations 
in  f EU closely follow the level and fluctuations in  σ , so we choose  ε σ = 0.00239 
so as to match the fluctuations in  f EU . We match the volatility values based on the 
Abowd-Zellner correction procedure. The value of  ρ is set to  0.983 , which generates 
an empirically reasonable amount of persistence.
III. Fluctuations in Gross Worker Flows
This section presents the quantitative implications of our calibrated model for the 
flows of workers across labor market states over the business cycle.20 We begin with 
a discussion of stocks and then turn to flows. As some key mechanisms in our model 
involve a compositional channel, we also examine data that allows corroboration of 
these effects. We also conduct a variance decomposition of unemployment changes 
in the data and the model into the different gross flows.
19 More generally, one might consider a specification in which the innovations are perfectly correlated but in 
which the individual components display different degrees of persistence. 
20 A relevant question is whether the business cycle analysis we conduct offers important insights beyond those 
that would emerge from considering steady state differences in response to permanent changes in frictions. We 
address this in detail in online Appendix A.11. While this analysis does convey some of the qualitative elements of 
our analysis, it misses others and is quite different quantitatively. In particular, intertemporal substitution effects are 
not captured in a steady state exercise, and as a result the participation rate becomes countercyclical. 
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A. Cyclical Properties of Stocks
We begin with the less stringent test in which we assess the ability of the model 
to match the cyclical movements in the three labor market stock variables: employ-
ment, the unemployment rate, and the participation rate. Table 7 shows the results 
for the benchmark model and the data. To compute correlations with output in 
our partial equilibrium model we generate a series for output by taking our model 
generated series for capital and efficiency units of labor and using them as inputs 
into a Cobb-Douglas production function with capital share parameter of  0.30 . All 
the model generated statistics are aggregated to quarterly frequency, logged, and 
HP-filtered using a smoothing parameter of 1,600, following the exact procedure 
that we apply to the data.
Table 7 reveals that our model of labor supply with shocks to frictions as the sole 
driving force does a very good job of accounting for the behavior of the three labor 
market stocks, not only qualitatively but also quantitatively. The key result here is 
that the behavior of the participation rate in the model closely matches its behavior in 
the data. In a two-state model with an exogenously fixed participation rate, shocks to 
job-finding and job-loss rates that match the movements in the data will necessarily 
provide a close match to observed movements in  E and  U precisely because move-
ments in participation are modest in comparison to movements in employment. The 
key issue then is whether our model featuring an endogenous participation margin 
will generate empirically reasonable movements in the participation rate. Table 7 
shows that our model is able to account for more than half of movements in the par-
ticipation rate, as well as the modest procyclical nature of these fluctuations.
It is important to emphasize that it is not clear a priori that this model would match 
even the qualitative features of participation rate fluctuations. The reason for this is 
that there are several competing forces. In a much simpler model based on steady 
state analysis, Krusell et al. (2010) show that holding all else constant, decreases 
in job-finding rates and increases in job separation rates lead to less time spent in 
employment, thereby lowering income. The negative wealth effect on labor supply 
associated with this decrease in income leads individuals to seek to increase time 
spent working in order to compensate for the loss in income. Individuals who desire 
to work more will be more likely to engage in active search when not employed, and 
will be less likely to leave a job when employed. These responses tend to generate a 
countercyclical participation rate.
But another force works in the opposing direction. In this model, participation for 
a non-employed worker represents an investment decision, in that a worker needs to 
pay the up-front cost associated with active search in order to generate a potential 
flow of income associated with successful job search. In good times there are three 
Table 7—Behavior of Stocks 
Data Model
 u  lfpr  E  u  lfpr  E 
 std(x)  0.1170  0.0026  0.0099  0.1207  0.0015  0.0096 
 corr (x, Y )  − 0.84  0.21  0.83  − 0.99  0.37  0.995 
 corr(x,  x −1 )  0.93  0.69  0.92  0.87  0.71  0.89 
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factors tending to increase the return on this investment. First, the probability of a 
successful search is greater. Second, the fact that separation rates are lower implies 
that a job match will last longer. Third, and most importantly, because arrival rates 
of outside opportunities for employed workers are higher, the prospects for wage 
increases via job-to-job transitions are greater.21 Taken together, these three factors 
make it more likely that the individual will engage in active search in good times, 
leading one to expect procyclical participation.
There are also effects that interact with the presence of UI benefits. In bad times 
there is an increase in separations, and these workers are all assumed to be eligible 
for UI. But collecting UI requires active search. Benefits may induce some individ-
uals to search actively who otherwise would not. On the other hand, lower arrival 
rates of jobs in bad times can increase the probability that benefits expire for an 
individual, which may lead to fewer individuals receiving benefits.
Despite the opposing forces at play, Table 7 shows that our model not only 
matches the key qualitative properties found in the data, but also does a good job 
quantitatively.
B. Cyclical Properties of Gross Flows
We next consider the more stringent test of whether the model is able to account 
for the key patterns in the gross flows that underlie these patterns for the stocks. 
Table 8 displays the key business cycle facts about the gross flows in the data and in 
the model. While we targeted the volatility of  f EU and  f UE using the Abowd-Zellner 
adjusted data, we also include the data based on the alternative adjustment. 
The model is able to account for the key cyclical patterns: it captures the coun-
tercyclicality of unemployment inflows ( E -to- U and  N -to- U flow rates), the pro-
cyclicality of unemployment outflows ( U -to- E and  U -to- N flow rates), and the 
procyclicality of flows between  E and  N . Although the model is very successful in 
replicating the cyclicality of the flows, there are some discrepancies between the 
data and the model in terms of the magnitudes of fluctuations for some of the flows. 
However, it is important to note that the alternative method for correcting for clas-
sification error (what we refer to as “de NUN ification”) implies levels of volatility 
that are much more in line with those predicted by our model. In view of this we feel 
that less weight should be attached to the discrepancies in volatility levels in Table 8. 
The model is also able to account for the procyclicality of job-to-job flows; 
Table 9 displays the cyclical properties of the job-to-job transition rate in the 
data and in the model.22 In addition to using the CPS, we use two additional data 
sources to compute the job-to-job transition rate, the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) and the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD), 
since the CPS measure of the job-to-job transition rate increasingly diverged from 
other measures, thus casting doubt on its reliability.23 The model generates cyclical 
21 We document this mechanism in online Appendix A.4. 
22 As in the case of the other flows, we do not make the time-aggregation correction. Mukoyama (2014) devel-
ops a method for time-aggregation correction in the case of the job-to-job transition rate and finds that it does not 
significantly alter the cyclical properties of the data. 
23 The details of the data are presented in online Appendix A.5. 
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 fluctuations in the job-to-job flows that are similar to those in the data, especially 
those in the SIPP and the LEHD.
Some of these cyclical patterns in the gross flows are quite intuitive and so do 
not merit much discussion. For example, the procyclical flow rate from  U to  E is 
mechanically driven by the procyclical shocks to  λ u , and the countercyclical flow 
from  E to  U is mechanically driven by the countercyclical pattern in the shocks to  σ . 
Procyclical job-to-job flows are also mainly because of procyclical  λ e . However, as 
noted earlier, we believe that two of the patterns that the model is able to replicate 
are at least somewhat counterintuitive. Specifically, during good times the transi-
tion rates from  E to  N and  U to  N are both higher, despite the fact that the stock of 
workers in  N is countercyclical. In what follows we therefore focus on describing 
the economics behind these patterns.
In thinking about the response of flows to a change in market conditions it is 
useful to distinguish two broad types of effects. At any point in time, individuals are 
distributed across the space of individual state variables. For a given set of market 
conditions, decision rules partition this space into the three labor market states  E , 
U , and  N and gross flows result from individuals crossing the boundaries between 
these regions. Hence a key determinant of these flows will be the mass of individuals 
who are near the boundary. When market conditions change, the boundaries of these 
regions change, and some individuals will change labor market states even condi-
tionally on not experiencing any change in their individual state variables. Note, 
however, that these are essentially one time changes in flows, in the sense that once 
the boundaries have adjusted and individuals are reclassified, going  forward in time 
Table 8—Gross Worker Flows 
 f EU  f EN  f UE  f UN  f NE  f NU 
Panel A. AZ-adjusted data
 std(x )  0.089  0.083  0.088  0.106  0.103  0.072 
 corr (x, Y )  −0.63  0.43  0.76  0.61  0.52  −0.23 
 corr (x,  x −1 )  0.59  0.29  0.75  0.62  0.38  0.30 
Panel B. De NUN ified data
 std(x )  0.069  0.036  0.076  0.066  0.041  0.063 
 corr(x, Y )  −0.66  0.29  0.81  0.55  0.57  −0.56 
 corr(x,  x −1 )  0.70  0.22  0.85  0.58  0.48  0.57 
Panel C. Model
 std(x )  0.089  0.057  0.088  0.029  0.051  0.076 
 corr (x, Y )  −0.79  0.21  0.69  0.47  0.57  −0.96 
 corr (x,  x −1 )  0.76  0.21  0.70  0.34  0.66  0.87 
Table 9—Job-to-Job Transition Rate 
Data source: CPS SIPP LEHD
Time period: 1994:I–2012:III 1990:III–2012:III 1996:III–2012:III 2000:III–2012:III Model
 std(x )  0.057  0.078  0.080  0.094  0.098 
 corr (x, Y )  0.69  0.36  0.43  0.94  0.54 
 corr (x,  x −1 )  0.60  0.68  0.68  0.93  0.72 
3468 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW NOVEMbER 2017
the flows will again be dictated by the mass of individuals crossing fixed boundar-
ies. While both one-time and persistent effects will shape the resulting correlation 
patterns, in the presence of persistent shocks to market conditions the correlations 
will intuitively be dominated by the persistent responses, which reflect movements 
of individuals across boundaries, rather than the movements in the boundaries 
themselves.
We start with the flow from  U to  N . To understand its behavior, it is essential 
to consider the changing composition of the unemployed. In particular, the key 
dynamic is that in good times the composition of this group shifts toward individu-
als who are less attached to work (i.e., close to the boundary of indifference between 
U and  N ), thereby increasing the fraction of unemployed individuals who cross the 
boundary into nonparticipation.24 To see why, note that in good times unemployed 
workers exit to employment more quickly, so the pool of unemployed individuals 
is relatively more composed of individuals who have just entered unemployment. 
Since employed workers are less likely to enter unemployment in good times (recall 
that the job separation probability decreases in good times), new entrants to unem-
ployment are dominated by individuals that transition from  N to  U . But these indi-
viduals are more likely to be close to the boundary, making them more susceptible 
to a transition that puts them back in the  N state. Put differently, workers who flow 
into unemployment as a result of an exogenous separation shock are more likely to 
be attached workers than the other workers (who flow in either by a voluntary move 
from employment or by moving from nonparticipation). The fraction of attached 
workers defined in this manner in total unemployment is countercyclical (with a cor-
relation of  − 0.65 with output) in the model. In Section IIIC, we document empiri-
cal evidence that shows that the composition of the unemployed pool shifts toward 
more attached workers during recessions using various proxies for attachment.
A related but distinct channel that may play a role in generating composition 
effects is the receipt of UI benefits. In our model a UI-eligible individual must 
actively search in order to receive benefits. Intuitively, an individual who is eligible 
for benefits is less likely to transition to nonparticipation. In our model, the higher 
separation rate in bad times implies that a higher fraction of the unemployment pool 
is UI-eligible in bad times, consistent with the evidence presented in Chodorow-
Reich and Karabarbounis (2016). Our model does not include UI extensions to the 
duration of UI benefits, but allowing for them would generate similar effects. To 
better understand the specific role of UI, we recompute the business cycle statistics 
in a model without a UI system in online Appendix A.12. We find that the  U -to- N 
flow rate remains procyclical suggesting that the composition effect in our model is 
not driven by the effects of UI. This finding is consistent with the recent literature 
on the labor supply and job search effects of UI extensions analyzed in Rothstein 
(2011) and Farber, Rothstein, and Valletta (2015). These effects are estimated to be 
24 In fact, for a given distribution of workers in the unemployment pool the immediate impact of a decrease 
in frictions is to expand the participation region (i.e., shrink the region of the state space that maps into  N ) and 
decrease the fraction who cross from  U into  N . But the resulting dynamic effects associated with lower frictions 
change the composition of the unemployment pool and increase the  U to  N flow. 
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small suggesting that UI extensions themselves cannot account for the strong procy-
clicality of flows from  U to  N .25
Next we consider the flow from  E to  N . In the model this flow is very weakly 
procyclical. Note also that similarly to the data, this flow exhibits very little serial 
correlation. These two properties stem from the fact that the persistent response in 
the  EN flow turns out to be very close to zero, so that the statistics for this flow are 
dominated by the immediate one-time changes in flows that are associated with the 
change in boundaries defined by the decision rules.26 To understand these effects it 
is important to note that there is an option value associated with staying employed. 
In particular, an employed individual understands that after a quit and hence a tran-
sition to  N , it will be costly to return to  E in the future (due to search costs and the 
time it takes to receive an employment opportunity). It follows that an employed 
individual needs to consider this option value when deciding whether to remain 
employed. As is standard in such a setting, an individual will remain employed 
even when it is “statically” suboptimal, on account of the option value of staying 
employed. When an aggregate shock decreases the level of frictions, the implicit 
costs of finding employment go down, and the option value diminishes. This results 
in a one time flow from  E into  N .
Lastly we consider the  N -to- U and  N -to- E flows. In the model the former flow 
is countercyclical and the latter is procyclical, as in the data. To see why the model 
delivers this pattern, note that the primary source of flows from  N into  U or  E is 
those individuals who are close to the boundary but on the  N side. A small shock to 
individual state variables could push such an individual across the boundary and into 
the  U or  E regions. For an individual to flow into  U , the individual must not receive 
an acceptable employment opportunity in the meantime, since this will take them 
from  N into  E instead. But during good times the increase in job opportunity arrival 
rates implies that marginal  N workers are more likely to receive offers that take them 
into  E , thus decreasing the flow of these workers into  U .
Note that our discussion highlights composition effects for flows involving work-
ers in  U but not for the other states. The reason for this is that the extent to which 
composition effects matter is very much influenced by the duration of spells within 
a state. If most workers in  N stay in  N for a long time, then it is hard for changes in 
the characteristics of workers flowing in to have a large impact on composition. In 
contrast, if workers do not stay in a state for long, then changes in the characteristics 
of workers who flow into the state can have a large impact on the composition. In 
fact, if one looks at the fraction of workers who stay in each of the three states from 
25 There is another channel through which UI extensions could affect the labor market, which is the effect of UI 
on vacancy creation examined in Hagedorn et al. (2015). They find the macro effect on vacancy creation to be quite 
large. When a worker and an employer agree to form a match, the extension of UI benefits may require an employer 
to offer higher wages given that more generous UI benefits improve the bargaining position of workers. This effect 
would show up as a lower value to an employer of a filled job. To the extent that the effect of UI is through the job 
creation/labor demand margin, it is already taken into account in our calibration of the cyclicality of the job offer 
arrival rates. Since we continue to be agnostic on the sources of fluctuations in job offer arrival rates (the  λ i s), our 
model is consistent with UI having a large effect on job creation as estimated by Hagedorn et al. (2015). 
26 The small persistent effect in turn reflects the combined effect of several small effects, including composi-
tional effects (this time including the distribution of match quality) and changes in wealth. 
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one month to the next then it is apparent that composition effects will be most rele-
vant for the pool of unemployed workers.27
C. Composition Effects in the Data
A key channel through which our model is able to match the cyclical flows into 
and out of the labor force is through changes in the composition of the unemploy-
ment pool over the cycle. Consistent with our model, Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin 
(2015) argue that a large part of the cyclicality of  U -to- N flows can be attributed to 
cyclical shifts in the composition of unemployed workers. As argued above, what 
is key in our model is the variation in the share of workers who are close to the  UN 
boundary. One proxy for closeness to this boundary is the extent of attachment that 
an individual has to being in the labor force. To examine this, Table 10 summa-
rizes other compositional shifts over the business cycle that might proxy for labor 
force attachment, such as gender and education. As the table shows, the unemployed 
pool shifts toward male, prime-age, and more educated workers, as well as toward 
workers who were employed a year ago and workers who classify themselves as 
job losers.28 The table also shows the unemployment to nonparticipation transition 
27 This is also consistent with the empirical findings of Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2015) who only find important 
compositional effects for flows out of unemployment. 
28 We include temporary layoffs in job losers. Figure A4.1 in online Appendix A.4 plots the cyclical variation in 
the share of unemployed accounted for by various subgroups: job losers, job leavers, and entrants. Figure A4.2 sep-
arates temporary layoffs from job losers. The cyclical properties of the fraction of job losers remains very similar. 
Table 10—Heterogeneity in  U -to- N Transition Probabilities
Subgroup of the unemployed   f UN 
Change in unemployment
share  ω in recessions (percent)
Gender
 Men 17.9 4.5
 Women 27.2   − 4.5 
Age
 16 to 24 28.1   − 6.1 
 25 to 54 18.2 5.3
 55 and over 24.9 0.8
Education
 No high-school degree 22.7   − 3.1 
 Only high-school degree 18.9 0.4
 Some college 17.9 2.3
 College degree 15.8 0.4
Labor force status one year ago
 Employed 14.3 4.2
 Unemployed 18.9 2.3
 Nonparticipant 37.2   − 6.5 
Reason for unemployment
 Job leaver 19.8   − 4.7 
 Job loser 14.8 12.5
 Entrant 34.2   − 7.8 
Notes: Calculated using the CPS microdata. Education statistics are for workers for 25 years and older. 
3471krusell et al.: gross worker flows over the business cyclevol. 107 no. 11
rates. Most of the groups whose unemployment shares rise during recessions also 
have lower unemployment to nonparticipation transition rates. In other words, the 
composition of the unemployed pool shifts toward workers who are more attached 
to the labor force during recessions.
D. Participation Flows and Unemployment Rate Fluctuations
As an additional test of the model’s implications for flows, we use the method 
of Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2015) to assess the importance of various flows in 
accounting for unemployment rate fluctuations. Table 11 summarizes the results 
for our model and the data. The key result is that our model does a very good job 
of matching the variance decomposition results derived from the data that have 
been adjusted for classification error using either the Abowd-Zellner correction or 
the de NUN ified correction. In particular, in all three cases the flows between  U 
and  N account for roughly 30 percent of unemployment rate fluctuations, with the 
remaining share driven virtually entirely by flows between  E and  U . Table A10.1 in 
online Appendix A.10 shows the contribution of each flow to the fluctuations in the 
unemployment rate. This table reveals that although the model does a good job of 
attributing unemployment fluctuations to fluctuations in flows between  U and  N , it 
underpredicts the role of the  UN flow and overpredicts the role of the  NU flow rela-
tive to the data. This is an artifact of the model’s implications for cyclical properties 
of flows between  U and  N . As Table 8 shows, the model underpredicts the volatility 
and procyclicality of the  U -to- N flow rate and overpredicts the countercyclicality 
of the  N -to- U flow rate thereby attributing a more important role to  N -to- U flows in 
accounting for unemployment fluctuations. In the second robustness experiment in 
online Appendix A.7, we consider a lower value for the persistence of the idiosyn-
cratic productivity process and set  ρ z = 0.94 . For that specification, the volatility 
of the  U -to- N flow rate increases and it becomes more procyclical. Consequently, 
as we report in Table A10.1, the model does a better job in matching the relative 
contributions of these two flows.
We take the result of this exercise to imply that our model not only captures the 
key qualitative patterns in the cyclical correlations of the various flows, but also 
accounts for the quantitative significance of flows into and out of the labor force 
over the business cycle. 
E. Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection, we examine the robustness of our findings along various 
dimensions.
Table 11—Variance Decomposition of Changes in the Unemployment Rate 
Total between
 U and  E  U and  N  E and  N 
Model 74.1 31.1  − 3.8 
Data-Abowd-Zellner 70.1 30.0 0.6
Data-De NUN ified 67.7 28.7 0.3
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Role of Job-Finding and Job-Loss Shocks:  Throughout our analysis we assumed 
that there were aggregate shocks to both the job-finding rates and to the job-loss 
rates. It is also of some interest to assess the relative importance of these two types 
of shocks. To evaluate this we simulate the model with the business cycle shock to 
the job-loss rate shut down but all other parameters kept unchanged. In the interest 
of space we do not present the detailed results but instead offer a brief summary. For 
the behavior of the three labor market stocks the main finding is that this specifica-
tion reduces the volatility of both the unemployment and employment rates by about 
one third relative to the benchmark, while leaving the volatility of the participation 
rate almost unchanged.
The behavior of the gross flows are relatively unaffected with two exceptions. 
The first is the volatility of  f EU . Not surprisingly, with shocks to  σ shut down the 
volatility of  f EU is reduced dramatically. However, the time aggregation implicit in 
our model specification does lead to countercyclical movements in  f EU even in the 
absence of shocks to  σ , though this effect accounts for only about 30 percent of the 
movement in  f EU . The other notable difference is that the correlation between  f UN 
and output turns negative. This is consistent with the explanations that we have 
articulated above.29 Specifically, we argued that the procyclical movement in  f UN 
resulted from a composition effect, due to the fact that in good times the unem-
ployment pool was increasingly composed of individuals who entered  U from  N . 
But the decrease in the job-separation rate during good times was one of the factors 
that influenced the size of this composition effect, since in good times it served to 
reduce the number of individuals in  U who entered from  E . It follows that shocks 
to the job-loss rate are important in shaping the observed behavior of flows between 
U and  N .
Role of Job-to-Job Transitions:  In our discussion of the model’s implications for 
the cyclicality of the participation rate we emphasized the role of intertemporal sub-
stitution that operates via the implicit effect of on-the-job search on wage cyclicality. 
To confirm this we have also conducted our analysis in a version of the model that 
eliminates on-the-job search. Full details are provided in online Appendix A.8, but 
the key result that we want to emphasize here is that the participation rate becomes 
strongly countercyclical in this version of the model. Moreover, the volatility of the 
participation rate is reduced by almost an order of magnitude relative to our bench-
mark model.
Role of the Idiosyncratic Productivity Process: We also consider how changing 
the features of the idiosyncratic productivity process affect our findings. In partic-
ular, we consider alternative values for the persistence parameter  ρ z ( 0.94 and  0.97 
at annual frequency) with adjustments to  σ ε in order to compensate for the implied 
change in the cross-sectional variation in  z . Complete results are provided in online 
Appendix A.7; here we present the key findings. For both values of  ρ z there is a 
very slight worsening in the model’s ability to match the steady state flows. For the 
higher value of  ρ z the implied business properties are virtually unchanged. For the 
29 This helps to explain why the volatilities of the participation rate are relatively unaffected even though the 
volatility of unemployment and employment declines. 
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lower value of  ρ z there is one slight change in the business cycle results: instead 
of the participation rate being mildly procyclical it becomes mildly countercycli-
cal. While this specification does not capture the cyclical behavior of the partic-
ipation rate, it does a better job in matching the volatility and cyclicality of the 
flows between  U and  N . In addition, as we discussed before, it captures the relative 
contribution of the flows between  U and  N in accounting for unemployment rate 
fluctuations better.
In the second exercise we lower the value of  σ ε 2 so that the implied annual stan-
dard deviation is  0.15 instead of  0.20 . Once again, we seek to match the same tar-
gets, implying changes to several other parameter values. The same two findings 
emerge here as well: the overall fit to the average gross flows in the data is slightly 
worse, and in the business cycle exercise the correlation between the participation 
rate and output is once again modestly negative ( − 0.21 ).
We draw two main conclusions from these two exercises. First, the properties of 
the idiosyncratic shock process matter for the ability of the model to match the aver-
age gross flows data. And second, matching these flows does matter for the model’s 
implications for business cycle fluctuations.
F. Summary
The discussion following our main results on flows laid out the key intuition for 
the qualitative patterns found in Table 8. Several mechanisms we emphasized are 
intimately connected with changes in the composition of individuals in different 
labor market states, and we then turned to the data to find that the compositional 
changes appear to occur in the data as well. Of course, the extent to which the model 
can reproduce the quantitative features of fluctuations in gross flows depends not 
only on the qualitative patterns but also the quantitative magnitudes of the various 
effects. It is reasonable to think that a key factor for the quantitative results is the 
mass of individuals that are near the participation boundary. In this regard, the dis-
cipline in our quantitative work derives from the fact that our steady state model is 
consistent with the average level of gross flows.
IV. Conclusion
We have developed a model of individual labor supply in the presence of frictions 
and used it to simulate the effects of aggregate shocks to frictions on labor market 
outcomes for a large set of households. Our model is calibrated to match the average 
values of the gross flows between all three labor market states. Our key finding is 
that fluctuations in job-finding and job-loss rates alone do a good job in accounting 
for both the qualitative and quantitative business cycle patterns in the gross flows 
data.
Importantly, despite the fact that our model assumes a constant wage rate per 
efficiency unit of labor, intertemporal substitution effects play a key role in allow-
ing the model to account for the movements in the participation rate. This chan-
nel emerges because of cyclical movements in frictions: a higher job-finding rate 
in good times implies that workers can climb up the job ladder more quickly, 
implying faster wage growth. This highlights the important interactions between 
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the two benchmark frameworks that we have merged: the frictionless model of 
 intertemporal  substitution, as in Lucas and Rapping (1969), and the frictional model 
as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
We believe that our model provides a compelling description of labor market 
flows. At any point in time most individuals are far from indifferent between work-
ing and not working. Flows from employment to unemployment do not reflect 
desired labor supply. But at any point in time there are individuals who are close 
to indifferent between working and not working and for these individuals desired 
labor supply, and how it responds to changes in the economic environment, does 
matter. In particular, intertemporal substitution effects and involuntary separations 
into unemployment can coexist. All in all, we consider our current model a much 
more satisfactory account of how labor market participation evolves over the busi-
ness cycle. It is also interesting to note, in particular, that as a corollary our model 
with worker heterogeneity can match the fluctuations in the participation rate with a 
rather standard formulation of household preferences, something which has proved 
challenging with other setups.
Our model offers a rich yet parsimonious description of individual labor supply in 
a setting with heterogeneity, search frictions, and an empirically reasonable market 
structure. It is the first paper to consider the effects of aggregate shocks on individ-
ual labor market transitions in this setting. However, it is also simplistic in some 
dimensions relevant for the microeconomic data. One of these dimensions regards 
our model of the household as an infinitely-lived unit. Clearly, an extension that dis-
tinguishes different members of the households would be relevant, as would an age 
dimension, along the lines of Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010). We do believe that 
our framework is a very useful starting point for these and many other extensions. 
It can also be used to understand how policy influences labor supply responses. For 
example, we could use our model to analyze how changes in features of the UI sys-
tem would influence the labor supply side of the labor market.
Related, we also believe that it is useful for assessing a variety of further issues. 
One involves using the model to study specific historic episodes; in fact, in online 
Appendix A.6 we indicate how one might begin to conduct an analysis of the partic-
ipation movements during the Great Recession from the perspective of the model. 
Another interesting issue involves heterogeneous effects of business cycles on var-
ious subgroups of the population. While we have focused on aggregate shocks to 
frictions, we can also study the effects of other aggregate shocks, including shocks 
to the wage distribution and the returns to saving. It would also be relevant in this 
context to consider a general equilibrium model where prices as well as frictions are 
endogenous. Given our results here, we are rather hopeful that such a model can be 
constructed.
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Elsby, Michael W. L., Bart Hobijn, and Ayşegül Şahin. 2015. “On the Importance of the Participation 
Margin for Labor Market Fluctuations.” Journal of Monetary Economics 72: 64–82. 
Fallick, Bruce, and Charles A. Fleischman. 2004. “Employer-to-Employer Flows in the U.S. Labor 
Market: The Complete Picture of Gross Worker Flows.” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-34.
Farber, Henry S., Jesse Rothstein, and Robert G. Valletta. 2015. “The Effect of Extended Unemploy-
ment Insurance Benefits: Evidence from the 2012–2013 Phase-Out.” American Economic Review 
105 (5): 171–76. 
Floden, Martin, and Jesper Linde. 2001. “Idiosyncratic Risk in the United States and Sweden: Is There 
a Role for Government Insurance?” Review of Economic Dynamics 4 (2): 406–37. 
French, Eric. 2005. “The Effects of Health, Wealth, and Wages on Labour Supply and Retirement 
Behaviour.” Review of Economic Studies 72 (2): 395–427. 
Fujita, Shigeru, Christopher J. Nekarda, and Garey Ramey. 2007. “The Cyclicality of Worker Flows: 
New Evidence from the SIPP.” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper 07-5. 
Fujita, Shigeru, and Garey Ramey. 2009. “The Cyclicality of Separation and Job Finding Rates.” 
International Economic Review 50 (2): 415–30. 
Galí, Jordi, Frank Smets, and Rafael Wouters. 2011. “Unemployment in an Estimated New Keynesian 
Model.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 17084.
Haefke, Christian, and Michael Reiter. 2011. “What Do Participation Fluctuations Tell Us About 
Labor Supply Elasticities?” IZA Discussion Paper 6039.
Hagedorn, Marcus, Fatih Karahan, Iourii Manovskii, and Kurt Mitman. 2015. “Unemployment Ben-
efits and Unemployment in the Great Recession: The Role of Macro Effects.” Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York Staff Report 646.
Hall, Robert E. 2005. “Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness.” American Eco-
nomic Review 95 (1): 50–65. 
Ham, John C. 1982. “Estimation of a Labour Supply Model with Censoring Due to Unemployment 
and Underemployment.” Review of Economic Studies 49 (3): 335–54. 
Krusell, Per, Toshihiko Mukoyama, Richard Rogerson, and Ayşegül Şahin. 2010. “Aggregate Labor 
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